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Introduction:
The Program of Emigrant Colonialism

Between 1880 and 1915, thirteen million Italians emigrated to North and South America, Europe, and the Mediterranean Basin, launching the largest emigration from any country in recorded world history. Italy’s experience stands out as an example of the globalizing processes of international migration, as emigration created a capillary network tying Italy in an intimate way to other societies across the world. It was a circulation of individuals and families, but also of capital, traditions, and ideas. Italian emigration changed Italy and the world, with a sustained impact on economic developments, social customs, governmental institutions, and political theory: historical lessons still relevant for immigration and emigration in the twenty-first century.

As a newly united nation, Italy struggled to adapt to its mass exodus. Intellectuals and politicians debated emigration’s impact and implications: Was emigration temporary or permanent, good or bad? Was it a “hemorrhage” of Italy’s best blood, or did it reflect the exuberance of the Italian people expanding across the globe? Should Italy center itself as the pole of Italians scattered worldwide, or should it conquer new territories for emigrant settlement under Italian rule? Intense controversy produced radically different proposals to solve Italy’s domestic and international problems. By 1900, Liberal statesmen had developed a flexible set of programs to establish a network of culture, trade, and exchange with Italians outside of Italy’s territory and legal reach. This idea of Italian expatriate communities to the mother country (la madre patria) was opposed by anti-Liberal Nationalists in Italy and anti-immigrant bigots worldwide, yet Italy reaped tremendous benefits from its emigration during a crucial period in its economic development.
From Italy's point of view, emigration presented a range of political and economic challenges and opportunities. In the first major study of Italian colonialism, published in 1874, Leone Carpi observed that the Italian word *colonia* meant not only overseas possessions, but also settlements of emigrants in foreign countries. Carpi proposed, based on this definition, that emigration itself was a type of colonial expansion, though tenuous and unpredictable. And unlike colonists in Africa who profited from exploiting indigenous laborers, emigrants themselves stood to be exploited unless protected by active intervention from their native country. With enormous human resources at stake, Italy had much to lose or gain by cultivating emigration. The state had first associated emigration with criminals, draft dodgers, or irresponsible adventurers. It was a problem for the national police. But as emigration rapidly grew, restricting population movements became impossible and even dangerous. The state began to intervene actively in migration, with the aim of extending international influence and reaping colonial benefits. The foreign ministry, responsible for Italy's possessions in Africa, also developed a policy for emigration settlements in Europe and the Americas. These official policies and related private programs I have termed “emigrant colonialism.” The Italian state mobilized resources and forged alliances, even with the Catholic Church, bridging the bitter gulf between church and state. Debates over emigration, and their consequences for domestic and foreign policy, shaped Italy's place in the world. Italians became pioneers in establishing a “global nation,” beyond imperial control and territorial jurisdiction, held together by ties of culture, communications, ethnicity, and nationality.3

How could Italy reach emigrants who had voluntarily left their homes? Italian activists and theorists emphasized the extralegal and nongovernmental aspects of Italian identity, or *italianità*: formative experiences in schools and churches; taste and tradition in food, literature, and music; ties to family in Italy; patriotic celebrations and festivals; and social clubs and organizations. In the words of Bishop Geremia Bonomelli, “Language and religion are the two principal means for keeping alive and solid the ties between mother Italy and her daughter Italy, which grows and prospers in the South American Continent.”4 This sentiment was confirmed by the work of social scientists: Lamberto Loria established the field of Italian ethnography at the height of emigration, between 1905 and 1913, by studying the behavior of Italian emigrants abroad, especially their loy-
alty to native traditions and cuisine (which required authentic Italian food imports). Loria and his colleagues hypothesized an overarching national identity over the many inevitable contradictions among the ancient peoples on the Italian peninsula, a cultural identity tried and tested through the crucible of emigration. With a scientific approach, *italianità* could be demonstrably replicated in a variety of environments and situations abroad. Emigrants' Italian identity could be proven to resist the pressures of assimilationist “melting pots” as if in a human laboratory. In defining *italianità* abroad as a sentimental tradition, rather than legal citizenship, Italians influenced their domestic identity as well. Italy is an example of what I term an “emigrant nation,” an analytical category embracing population at home and also abroad, beyond territorial borders. “Making Italy Abroad” meant not just forming an expatriate community, but changing Italy itself. Emigration's impact was fundamental, shifting the roots of society and culture in the mother country and also in Europe, the Americas, and Africa, much like the mass migrations of the twenty-first-century world. While many aspects of the Italian experience were unique to an imperialist era, the theoretical questions that Italians faced still bear comparison today.

Italy was itself a new creation, recently united as a country between 1859 and 1871 after more than a millennium of regional divisions. Italian Liberals triumphed with the establishment of a constitutional monarchy ruling the entire peninsula, but Republicans were bitterly disappointed. The King of Sardinia, Victor Emmanuel II, now King of Italy, drew upon a long pedigree from his family's rule of Piedmont but lacked a clear vision for his new possessions. The Italian Parliament too remained uncertain on how to face the future. One of the state's first challenges was a wildly expanding and fluctuating current of emigration. Though one of the most densely populated countries in Europe, Italy lagged behind its neighbors in economic productivity and development. Italian laborers had long traveled for temporary work to neighboring regions within Italy and to Austria-Hungary, Germany, Switzerland, and France. But under the pressures of industrialization and changing markets, transoceanic emigration became more attractive and more necessary. Italian workers could double or triple their wages by working abroad.3 The northern regions of Veneto, Lombardy, and Liguria maintained emigration to Europe, and launched a growing migration to South America. From 1898 onward, however, the United States surpassed Brazil and Argentina as a
destination for emigrants, and emigration to Brazil dropped off after 1901. Australia, which had hosted thousands of Italians, sharply curtailed its own immigration in 1901. In these years at the turn of the century, emigration from southern Italy began en masse, primarily to the United States. Year by year, steamships displaced sailing ships in the transatlantic passenger trade, making the crossing fast, cheap, and safe. Between 1878 and 1881, Italy's annual migration to the Americas doubled from twenty to forty thousand; it doubled again by 1886, exceeding consistently high continental migration, then doubled again in 1891 and again in 1904, with more than half a million Italians emigrating across the Atlantic in 1906 and 1913. From 1905 to 1907, one in fifty Italians emigrated each year; in 1913, 2.4 percent of Italy's resident population emigrated abroad. The national census of 1911 revealed that Italian expatriates numbered more than one-sixth of Italy's population.6

Such colossal numbers, and their impact, made emigration the most important issue facing Italy after unification. Italian society, culture, and politics relied upon a shifting population base, as emigrants moved between countries and continents or returned home, taking social and economic resources with them. Emigration galvanized a host of domestic concerns: ancient divisions within the recently united peninsula, regional underdevelopment in southern Italy, prevailing illiteracy, and organized crime. Why did so many choose to depart their newly created country? What did it mean to be Italian abroad and at home?

Emigrant settlement also molded Italy's international identity. Italy had been formed as a Great Power, alongside Britain, Russia, France, Austria-Hungary, and Germany. As a result, Italy's leaders felt pressure after 1882 to compete in the European scramble for colonies in Africa and Asia. Could Italy afford to fall behind the king of Belgium, who by 1885 had seized the Congo Basin? Italian emigration and colonialism developed together, joined by proposals to settle Italian African territories with emigrants diverted from the Americas. In the background loomed fears of Europe's Great War, cast in terms of the Darwinian "struggle for life."? The war was inevitable after Germany's annexation of French territory in 1871; it would explode in 1914, at the height of mass migration. Would Italian emigrants fight for the survival of their mother country?

Amid the many tensions resulting from emigration, two theories regarding Italian expatriates forever changed international politics: na-
tional socialism and irredentism. Enrico Corradini’s national socialism characterized Italy as a “proletarian nation” whose emigrant workers were enslaved and abused by “bourgeois nations.” According to Nationalists and Fascists, Italy must unite its social classes internally, and overthrow its external masters by international armed struggle. Another explosive theory was irredentism, meaning the national redemption of ethnic minorities abroad. Not all Italians had been united within the borders of the Kingdom of Italy: the “nation” of the Italian people was not yet one with the Italian “state.” This missing culmination of political union fostered an enduring concern for Italians outside Italy. The term “irredentism,” invented in the 1870s, evoked the redemption of Italian lands still under Austrian imperial rule (le terre irredente) by including all speakers of the Italian language in the Italian nation and uniting their territory to the Italian polity. Like other irredentist movements that have aimed to unite populations across political borders, Italian activists made ethnic identity, language, and religion into key weapons of political struggle across international borders. The massive movement of emigrants outside the kingdom led to a union of irredentists with emigration advocates, both joining in social, cultural, and ultimately political concern for Italians abroad. Teaching the Italian language abroad was subsidized by the Italian government directly and indirectly through Italian religious, secular, and state schools abroad. Adult Italian emigrants who spoke only regional language and dialects, and their children born abroad, would learn the “language of Dante” to communicate with fellow emigrants and with the Italian state. Emigrants became part of Italy’s ongoing drama of unification and Risorgimento, or resurgence, building Italy as a “global nation.” The romantic fervor and dynamism of political exiles such as Giuseppe Mazzini and Giuseppe Garibaldi had earlier provided vital impetus and support for Italy from abroad. Now Italian expatriates again played an integral part in shaping the face of their fatherland, much like the roles played by Chinese emigrants in establishing the Chinese republic and Polish emigrants in creating an independent Poland in the twentieth century.

An expatriate network offered clear advantages to the Italian state. To extend its reach, the government collapsed the analytical categories of emigrant, exile, expatriate, and unredeemed into the single theoretical concept of “Italians Abroad.” All were part of the fatherland, without distinguishing between emigrants traveling third-class and expatriate
businessmen traveling first-class. Under the banner of Italians Abroad, Italy pioneered an ethnic form of “cultural citizenship,” valuing cultural belonging over formal political allegiances. Beyond the idealized “nation-state” of the Kingdom of Italy, uniting all members of the Italian nation in a single state, there was the imagined “nation-superstate,” a network of Italians worldwide in a supranational global nation. Drawing upon the powerful rhetoric of irredentism, the government held censuses of Italians abroad, and sponsored congresses and expositions to showcase the accomplishments of Italians beyond the borders of Italy. Perhaps Italy could imitate the world’s biggest empire. J. R. Seeley had argued in 1883 that the British empire had developed spontaneously, expanding from Britain into a “Greater Britain.” To forge a “Greater Italy,” the Liberal Italian state deliberately treated emigration and colonial expansion as one and the same.

With a powerful resonance, Italians conflated the mass migration of workers with the expatriation of intellectual and political elites. The exile of Dante Alighieri from his native Florence, and even the emigration of Virgil from Mantua, blended rhetorically with the temporary economic exile of millions of laborers worldwide. When considering historic precedents for emigration, Liberal Italian politicians shunned the idea of “diaspora,” or dispersal. The historic plight of the Jewish nation, its population scattered by defeat and decline, challenged Italy to react creatively to the dangers and risks of emigration. Before Italy’s unification, the ancient nation had been regularly compared with fallen Israel. Giuseppe Mazzini characterized the divided Italian peoples as “soldiers without a banner, Israelites among the nations,” and indicated that unification would remove the need for emigration. Giuseppe Verdi launched his career in 1842 with the patriotic opera Nabucco, adapting the history of Nebuchadnezzar and the Babylonian Captivity as a parable for the contemporary oppression of Italians by the Austrian Empire. The diasporic children of Israel pine for their homes, and Verdi’s chorus “Va pensiero sull’ali dorate,” based on Psalm 137, became a patriotic anthem for Italians divided under papal, Habsburg, and Bourbon rule:

Fly, my thoughts, on golden wings,
Go to rest on the slopes and hills
Where breezes warm and free
Make fragrant my native soil!
Greet the banks of the Jordan,
The fallen towers of Zion,  
My beautiful and desolate fatherland!  
What dear and fatal memories!¹³

But once the Kingdom of Italy had united the peninsula, except for lands still under Austro-Hungarian rule, Italian subjects were no longer the slaves of foreign empires. Italy’s liberal rulers believed the new home country would meet its children’s needs abroad, and there would be no more diaspora.¹⁴ Instead, the word became a politically loaded invective to attack the government of Liberal Italy. Enrico Corradini, who founded the Italian Nationalist party and rallied support for Benito Mussolini’s Fascism, condemned Italy’s support for emigration in 1909: “The Jews of antiquity always mourned their emigration which they called dispersion, diaspora. But we have become used to boasting of it . . . this appears a sign of our blindness and meanness of spirit, from which the Jews did not suffer.”¹⁵ Some scholars today have applied the term “diaspora” to Italian emigration in this period, but unlike the Jewish and African diasporas, Italians were never stateless. Italy offered diplomatic aid abroad and support for return home. The state aimed to bring all Italians together to recreate the international prestige, power, and wealth of Italy’s former glories.

Italy’s history offered two very different models for achieving imperial greatness based upon population settlement. Ancient Roman legions had conquered and then settled colonies in the Mediterranean, spreading Italian language and culture by force as well as by persuasion. The vision of a reborn Roman empire in Africa promised power and influence for “Greater Italy,” and was the basis of Italy’s African empire in the nineteenth century. Its principal architect was prime minister Francesco Crispi, who in 1890 pioneered state-sponsored settler colonialism in East Africa along the Red Sea, with emigration as his justification:

What is our purpose in Eritrea? Our purpose is the institution of a colony that can accommodate that immense emigration which goes to foreign lands, placing this emigration under the dominion and laws of Italy; our purpose is also to do everything that can help our commerce and the commerce of the country we have occupied.¹⁶

Crispi promised to Parliament to protect emigrants on conquered Italian soil in Africa. His disastrous error was to assume the African lands were blank slates awaiting occupation by Italy’s surplus population of would-be emigrants.
An alternative model for imperial power and wealth recalled the medieval trading empires of Venice and Genoa. Some Liberals argued that Italy could support Italian emigrant communities worldwide in a cooperative, patriotic synergy. Instead of exploiting foreign populations by force, Italy’s “colonies” of emigrants would voluntarily maintain ties with their mother country, at less expense and with much less bloodshed. To encourage this transnational relationship, Italian state rhetoric maintained that emigrants were an organic part of the nation and part of the expanded state, linked through a shared cultural background. This somewhat artificial identity was deliberately constructed, subsidized, and elaborated through a variety of channels for young and old, including schools, patriotic banquets, choirs and bands, gymnastic groups, the Dante Alighieri Society, the Italian Geographic Society, the Catholic Scalabrinian missionaries, and Italian Chambers of Commerce Abroad. Liberal Italy looked to emigrant settlements or colonies in the Mediterranean and the Americas, whether of wealthy traders in Cairo, construction workers in Tunis, or the growing Italian populations of Buenos Aires and New York, to bring territories within Italy’s sphere of influence.

For Italy to gain benefits from its emigrants, the fruits of their sacrifices would have to return home. The state encouraged and welcomed all return migration, be it from patriotic loyalty, economic disappointment abroad, or visits to family at home. Approximately half of Italian emigrants returned, bringing capital and experience with them. Upon return all emigrants regained Italian citizenship automatically, even if they had previously renounced it. With the support of United States regulators, Italy set up a special channel for emigrants to send home remittances, accumulating in the millions of dollars, through the nonprofit Banco di Napoli. Italian emigration provided economic returns that African imperialism could never match. As Italy transformed from an agricultural to an industrial economy, emigrant remittances steadied the Italian currency and contributed substantially to Italy’s international balance of payments on the gold standard. At the grassroots level, the infusion of money helped end usury in the countryside and fund new homes and new businesses. Those returning to their hometowns from overseas were called “Americans” with the stereotype of wealth, independence, and exotic mystique. Thanks to chain migration building upon family connections and local friendships, many Italian towns produced a mirror community of emigrants concentrated in a town or neighbor-
hood overseas. But could these advantages be sustained on the national level for Italy? What were the long-term risks and advantages of developing emigration as colonial expansion?

Emigration directly affected Italy’s strategic situation, just as migration shapes international security in the twenty-first century. The massive numbers of male emigrants, and their male children, were all reservists or prospective soldiers in the Italian conscript army. Consuls abroad maintained records of male emigrants so they could be recalled to the Italian army. The debate over dual citizenship for emigrants turned on the military obligations of universal conscription. Even males born abroad to Italian fathers were by Italian law held responsible for military service in wartime. The Italian state’s eagerness to appropriate emigrants as subjects of the Italian King, and to claim emigrant settlements as Italian colonies, influenced how migrants were perceived in their new communities, even if individual immigrants had broken ties with their native land. Nations receiving Italians in North and South America and Europe, such as the “immigration-states” of Argentina and the United States, viewed Italy’s designs with suspicion, as the Italian state planned for Italians in America to remain loyal to their mother country in affection, culture, and trade even during military hostilities. Italy’s policies could run directly counter to emigrants’ best interests.

Controversies over colonialism engaged Italy’s most prominent politicians, including the founder of Italian Socialism Filippo Turati, the foreign minister Antonino Di San Giuliano, and the prime ministers Luigi Luzzatti and Benito Mussolini. This crucial debate in foreign policy and societal vision proved a potent dialectic in Italian politics from 1890 through World War II. Emigration shaped history within Italy and beyond, affecting European colonialism in Africa, the international economy, the birth of national socialism, and the societies and cultures of the Americas and Africa influenced by the emigrants themselves.

Like gender, race, and class, migration affects all aspects of history, including social, diplomatic, political, economic, and cultural histories. The international history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries must incorporate migration trends and their fundamental impact. Yet the chronology of emigration resists the standard narrative of historical turning points in sending and receiving countries. Emigration’s timetable depends upon the decisions of millions of individuals, choosing to leave
their homes; and the decisions of a few legislators, who set the limits of emigrants’ choices. Apart from the business cycles of boom and bust, for Italian emigrants the major turning points were 1901, the date of Italy’s second emigration law, with its farsighted provisions guiding the peak years of emigration; 1915, when Italy entered the Great War; and 1924, when the United States Congress all but ended Italian immigration under a harsh quota regime.

The story of one individual migrant illustrates many of the transnational issues of politics, family, economics, religion, and war connected to migration. On Columbus Day, 1905, Vincenzo Di Francesca entered New York City, after crossing the ocean aboard the steamship Città di Napoli and passing the federal inspections at Ellis Island. Seventeen years old, he had emigrated at the invitation of his brother Antonio, leaving the rest of his family behind in the village of Gratteri, Palermo province, Sicily. Vincenzo remained firmly within Italian spheres even as he traveled the globe. In New York City he converted to Methodism and became a pastor in an Italian Protestant congregation. In November 1914 the Italian consul notified Vincenzo that he had been called to military duty back in Italy. Vincenzo gathered his savings and returned to his homeland. When Italy entered World War I in May 1915, he began service on the front lines with his infantry regiment. After the war he returned to New York, and then was sent to Australia as a pastor to the nascent Italian community in Melbourne. He returned to Italy in 1932 and married a Sicilian. When Italy launched its imperialist invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, Vincenzo was recalled to the army. He was a civilian by the time of World War II but was nonetheless terrified by the Allied bombardment and invasion of Sicily in 1943. Afterwards, Vincenzo decided to retire to a house so remote that no invading army would ever again embroil him in fighting. Miles away from his native village, in the Sicilian interior, he lived the rest of his life in peace.\(^\text{22}\)

Vincenzo Di Francesca’s story is, of course, unique, but it reflects specific currents in the larger history of Italian migration. The date of his arrival in New York, 12 October, had recently become Columbus Day thanks to the political activity of the city’s Italians. The public commemoration of Christopher Columbus, the Italian who united Europe and the Americas, signaled the coalescence of individual immigrants into an influential community, under the leadership in part of Italy and its state-sponsored organizations. Vincenzo’s adoption of Protestantism was not
From Africa to the Americas

In June 1887, the Italian government celebrated its annual Festival of the Constitution by dedicating an extraordinary monument in Rome: an Egyptian obelisk from the reign of Ramses II. The recently excavated obelisk was more than three thousand years old; the Italian state was infantile in comparison. Its constitution had been granted in 1848 by the King of Piedmont-Sardinia, Carlo Alberto. After two wars of unification Carlo Alberto’s son had become the first King of Italy in 1861. Rome became Italy’s capital only in 1871, with the fall of papal rule. Nonetheless, the new Italy claimed a much older tradition as the “Third Rome,” following the Roman Empire of antiquity and the papal Rome of the Renaissance. Monumental obelisks were the most tangible symbol of revived global ambitions. Ancient emperors had brought them to Rome from Africa at great expense, and had ordered imitation obelisks to be carved as well. Renaissance popes had excavated and restored the huge stones, then redesigned the city around them, cutting broad new streets and placing the obelisks at the focal points. By early 1887, obelisks stood before the Italian Royal Palace, the Chamber of Deputies, St. Peter’s Basilica, and the Lateran Palace. In all, eleven obelisks could be seen across the city, each topped with the religious symbol of a crucifix, a dove, or the papal arms.1 The new obelisk, however, would carry no cross: it was topped by the Star of Italy.

Five months before the obelisk’s dedication, Italy had suffered its first major colonial defeat, in East Africa. On 26 January 1887, Ethiopian forces under Ras Alula ambushed and massacred 422 Italian soldiers near Dogali.2 Prime Minister Agostino Depretis’ government resigned;
although Depretis was reappointed in April, the leading figure in the new government was the Interior Minister, Francesco Crispi. Under his leadership, Dogali became a summons for commemoration and vindication. Ramses II's obelisk had been discovered in 1883; Crispi decided to place the obelisk on the second largest piazza in Rome, in front of the main train station, and dedicate it "to the heroes of Dogali" (see illustrations). The piazza was also renamed Piazza dei Cinquecento ("Piazza of the 500") in honor of the fallen, whose names were inscribed on a bronze plaque at the obelisk's base.3 The ceremony consecrated a secular, Africanist site within the geography of the Eternal City. Crispi thus exploited the shame of defeat at Dogali to bind modern Italian imperialism with ancient Roman traditions.

How Italy could fulfill an imperial role was far from clear. Italy's political philosophers had begun to raise expectations even before the peninsula had been unified in Italy's Risorgimento, or resurgence, under Piedmontese rule. The abbot Vincenzo Gioberti published a celebrated three-volume study of the "primacy of the Italian race" in 1844. After listing Italian triumphs in the arts, sciences, morals, and politics, he predicted wondrous consequences if Italy's nine small kingdoms, duchies, and Papal States were unified. Gioberti served as prime minister of Piedmont in 1848–1849, and his ideas resonated throughout the peninsula. His contemporary Giuseppe Mazzini, the apostle of Italian Republicanism, envisioned an even greater international role for Italy. He felt that each nationality in Europe had a mission ordained by God. In the eighteenth century, the French Revolution had brought the Rights of Man to the world; in the nineteenth century, Italian unification would establish something yet more important, the Duties of Man. In 1871 Mazzini called upon the newly united Italy to take part in the colonial expansion of Europe by bringing civilization to North Africa. The new Italian state would not be content with improving its own civil society, raising literacy, and developing its uneven economy. Rather, Italy would have to find a role on an international stage.4

Italy had distinct disadvantages in pursuing an empire. Unlike France and Britain, the new Kingdom of Italy lacked the capital resources to develop plantation colonies for economic exploitation. Instead of an expanding economy seeking new markets, Italy boasted a robust population and a glorious imperial past. The ancient Roman empire was mined for monumental symbols, like the obelisks, and an imperial ethos. The
other Great Powers of Europe, including France, Britain, Russia, Germany, and Austria, also claimed to be Rome’s heirs; Italy’s designs were different. Italian colonialists cited the ancient Roman legions that had settled, developed, and defended imperial outposts. In this tradition, Italian political rhetoric defined colonial expansion as the development of Italy’s population overseas. Each emigrant settlement was a “colonia,” the same term used for Italy’s African colonies. To distinguish between the two types of colonies, Italian theorists called emigrant settlements “spontaneous colonies,” while African possessions were called “colonies of direct dominion.” The ambiguous direction of Italian colonialism, and the rapid growth of Italian emigration, combined together for an incendiary debate in Italian politics and culture over how and where to build the long-sought dream of Greater Italy.

Understanding Italy’s Mass Emigration

As Italy joined other European states in the “scramble for Africa” between 1881 and 1898, millions of Italians left their country in an unprecedented transatlantic mass migration, establishing their own American colonies. For Italians, America did not mean the United States, but the land named for Amerigo Vespucci: North and South America. Even more broadly, America meant migration outside Europe and the Mediterranean Basin, which had long been familiar destinations. One woman who emigrated to Melbourne explained, “I migrated to America. It did not occur to me that Australia was not in fact America.” Adolfo Rossi confessed, “I had read some books about the United States the previous month and had fallen in love with North America: this was the only reason I picked New-York instead of Sidney or Buenos Ayres [sic].” “America” became a legend of employment, opportunity, and sacrifice. Hundreds of thousands of Italians traveled to the Americas for work, without ever having traveled to Rome or Florence for pleasure. One observer in Argentina noted “the word America has come to mean wealth, prosperity, fortune. To justify their hard life, the Italians say that they came to America to do America [fare l’America] and not to learn Castilian Spanish.” Most migrants planned to work hard, save, and go back to Italy, never becoming part of local society. America became the direct object to an action verb (as in fare l’America), an imagined economic site rather than a place with its own traditions, culture, and history.
Chain migration networks, fostered by American immigration law, widened the gulf between Italian migrants and their American neighbors. The United States did not allow American companies to recruit laborers abroad; migrants therefore traveled to places where they had other connections or acquaintances. Through successive waves of emigration, many Italian villages developed sister communities in the Americas. Emigrants could travel thousands of miles and never leave the ambit of their fellow villagers, friends, and families. Stonecutters from Massa and Carrara in Tuscany went to and from Barre, Vermont. Emigrants from Molfetta in Puglia went to Hoboken, New Jersey; from Bagnoi del Trigno in Molise to Fairmont, New Jersey; from Floridia in Sicily to Hartford, Connecticut. Natives of Pachino, Sicily, established settlements in Toronto, Canada; Caracas, Venezuela; and Lawrence, Massachusetts. Emigrants from the other side of Sicily in Sambuca, 125 miles away, chose between sambucese neighborhoods in New Orleans, Chicago, or Brooklyn, New York.

Emigration exposed relative hardship in “the beautiful country” of Italy (il bel paese). Prefects in the Italian provinces reported in 1882 that emigrants were leaving their villages to improve their economic conditions or, less often, to escape poverty. Crushed under one of Europe’s highest tax burdens, threatened by malaria, isolated by a lack of roads, with their vineyards devastated by phylloxera disease, many families found a better future abroad. In contrast with the Irish, relatively few penniless Italians found benefactors to pay their passage overseas. Most migrants raised money by selling or mortgaging their land and possessions, sometimes falling prey to deceitful emigration agents working on sales commissions. Author Edmondo De Amicis traveled from Northern Italy to Argentina in 1884, and reported conditions aboard his steamship, which carried 1,400 emigrants in third class:

Many groups had already formed, as always happens, among emigrants of the same province or profession. Most of them were peasants. And it was not difficult for me to follow the dominant theme of the conversations: the sad state of the agricultural class in Italy; too much competition among workers, to the advantage of landlords and tenants; low wages, high prices, excessive taxes, seasons without work, poor harvests, greedy employers, no hope for improvement. . . . In one group, with a note of bitter gaiety, they laughed at the upper class, soon to be devoured by anger when they found themselves without workers and forced to double
salaries, or to give up their lands for a piece of bread. "When we will have all gone away," said one, "they will die of hunger too." 13

The implications of mass emigration disturbed landlords and politicians. Italians bitterly debated what to do about the rising tide of emigration, which revealed deep conflicts over Italy’s domestic and foreign priorities.

Lacking statistics, politicians couched emigration in moral terms as either “good” or “bad.” Landlords condemned emigrants as adventurers, draft dodgers, and reprobates. 14 The Italian government’s office of statistics began collecting emigration data only in 1876, artificially dividing emigrants’ passport requests into two categories, temporary and permanent. Transatlantic migration was assumed to be permanent; migration within Europe and the Mediterranean, temporary. In reality, however, some Italians did settle permanently in France, or departed from France in search of better opportunities in Argentina. The fluidity of emigration gradually became clear, and after 1904 statisticians divided migration simply into transoceanic and European/Mediterranean. 15

Year after year, emigration defied the predictions of social science, as high levels of migration to Europe were topped by wildly fluctuating emigration to the Americas. 16 (See Appendix, Figure 1.1.) Ligurians had emigrated overseas in large numbers since the 1840s and 1850s, following their countryman Christopher Columbus, but after Italy’s unification, mass migration spread to the agricultural interior. Even industrializing regions produced a startling exodus: thousands left the valleys of Biella in northern Italy, just as others arrived to work in the Biellese textile factories. 17 The North produced more emigrants than the poorer South, but the South produced more per capita. The Veneto region led the nation between 1880 and 1915 with more than three million emigrants; Campania, the region around Naples, sent 1.45 million emigrants, Calabria sent 870,000, and Basilicata sent 375,000. Emigration from Sicily remained quite low through the 1880s, at 41,000, compared to 93,000 from Calabria and 81,000 from Basilicata, even though Sicily had more than twice the population of Calabria and five times the population of Basilicata. 18 After the Italian state’s bloody suppression of the Sicilian Fasci trade unions in 1893–1894, Francesco Nitti, a native of Basilicata, urged Sicily in 1896 to imitate its neighbors: “Sicily is much richer than Basilicata and Calabria. . . . It is more unbalanced only because there has been no emigration.” 19 Unable to change conditions at
home, Sicilians emigrated abroad. Before 1914, 1.3 million left the island; the vast majority traveled to the United States and many settled there permanently.20

Emigration expanded so rapidly that the state struggled to manage or at least monitor the phenomenon through statistics and regulations. Nearly all Italians traveled with passports, which qualified poor emigrants for assistance from Italian consuls and, as Italian officials noted, “might be useful to them when dealing with foreign authorities.”21 Yet some continued to depart clandestinely without papers, to escape conscription or debts, for example, or to enter the United States without passing health and “moral” examinations. Unrecorded clandestine migration continued into the twentieth century. In 1913, Italy’s all-time record year for emigration, inspectors found emigrants traveling in secret on almost every steamship leaving Italy, sometimes listed as crew and often not listed at all.22 Italian consulates collected data about local Italians abroad, who were numbered in Italy’s national census starting in 1871. At first the census was a matter of pride for the Italian king, who could boast of “more than a million” subjects abroad in 1881, but the census became a serious political and statistical tool.23 No census was taken in 1891 for lack of funds, but the consuls’ detailed responses to the 1901 international census were published in nine volumes as Emigrazione e colonie. This study reversed categorical thinking by describing the Italians in Tunisia as a permanent colony and in Argentina as a temporary colony, since few Italians had become Argentine citizens.24 Consuls usually counted Italian citizens together with Italian speakers from Austria-Hungary, as well as second-generation migrants, even American citizens, if they had Italian fathers.

Statistics revealed how migration followed the trends of political competition, racial prejudice, and impersonal market forces. Emigrants were a valued labor resource for expanding economies but the first to be unemployed in depressed economies.25 Migration from northern Italy to Argentina began in the 1870s, but Brazil surpassed Argentina as an emigrant destination by 1888. (See Appendix, Figure 1.2.) In this year slavery was finally abolished in Brazil, and its regional governments began to pay for the passage of white Europeans to work the country’s coffee and sugar plantations. Italians named their new rural settlements after their home towns, founding Nova Milano, Nova Roma, Nova Bassano, Nova Vicenza (later Farroupilha), Nova Prata, Nova Brescia, Nova Trento, and
Nova Pompeia (later Pinto Bandeira) in southern Brazil. Nonetheless, many Italians were treated harshly by plantation masters. The Italian government intervened in 1902 by banning subsidized migration to Brazil; emigrants would have to buy their own tickets. Emigration to Brazil rapidly declined, even as migration to the United States soared. The Panic of 1907 and another American economic crisis in 1911, coupled with Italy’s Libyan War in 1911–1912, caused temporary drops in migration to the United States. Argentina drew a steady current of migration, but in 1911–1912 Italy enforced a political boycott. The Italian state blocked travel to Argentina by working-age males, by far the largest demographic group of Italian emigrants, to force the Argentines to recognize their economic dependence on this labor supply. Transatlantic migration ended temporarily with the calamity of World War I, then returned briefly after the war, before strict immigration restrictions and economic depression ended the flow. Italy’s mass emigration to Australia began only after World War II, when migration to the United States and Canada also revived.

The United States played a unique role as the most attractive, yet most restrictive, country of immigration. New York City was the premier port of entry, and in 1855 the New York state government established Castle Garden in Battery Park, Manhattan, as a screening facility to receive healthy immigrants and reject unhealthy or politically subversive foreigners. After New York had processed eight million immigrants, the United States government assumed this role in 1890, and built elaborate facilities at Ellis Island in New York Harbor under the direction of the Public Health Service and the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Immigration. First- and second-class travelers were not required to stop at Ellis Island for medical examinations, because they had paid much higher fares. Third-class travelers in steerage, by contrast, were considered “immigrants” and possibly unwelcome, and twelve million were processed at Ellis Island by 1924. Even before they embarked from Europe, migrants were screened by American inspectors, and relatively few were rejected upon arrival in the United States. Brazil and Argentina organized similar facilities, the Hospedaria de Imigrantes at Sao Paolo and the Hotel de Inmigrantes at Buenos Aires, but these stations were smaller and less restrictive than Ellis Island.

The criteria for migrants’ entry came under fierce debate in the United States and in Italy. At ports on both sides of the Atlantic, inspectors rejected
immigrants according to an expansive checklist: those judged to be “idiots, insane, paupers, diseased persons, convicts, polygamists, women [immigrating] for immoral purposes, assisted aliens, contract laborers, anarchists, [or] procurers” were sent back to their homes in Europe. Contagious and “loathsome” diseases and conditions that qualified for exclusion included trachoma, varicose veins, hernia, ringworm, arthritis, anemia, pellagra, epilepsy, tuberculosis, and venereal diseases. Unwed mothers, unaccompanied minors, and charity cases were refused entry, as were immigrants who had arranged for work in America before their arrival—an exclusion which defied logic, but was defended by American labor unions. Anti-immigration activists proposed literacy tests as an additional restriction.

To combat mafia and organized crime, the American consul in Palermo suggested the rejection of “those who hold belief in omertà, [namely] an antisocial practice, based partly on the cowardice of fear and partly on a distorted sense of honor, which extends assistance to the criminal rather than to the victim of a crime, and blocks the administration of justice by refusing to testify or by giving false testimony.” The consul cited the trial of an innkeeper who had silently abetted a kidnapping and murder, who told the court, “I wish the jurors to know that if I had been guilty I would have escaped to America as I had plenty of time.” Such stories tarnished the reputations of all Italians in the United States. To combat immigration restrictions and to improve its public image, the Italian state relied upon its Italian Chambers of Commerce in New York, San Francisco, and elsewhere. Many of the Italian members had become American citizens, and could influence American politics directly as voters rather than as outsiders.

Italy also contemplated restrictions on emigration. When Italian parliamentary committees discussed emigration for the first time in 1888, they demonstrated the personal prejudices, factual errors, philosophical divisions, and confusion surrounding emigration, even though policy changes in emigration would affect the lives of millions. A nobleman from Messina, Sicily, told his committee “he does not think the absolute freedom of emigration is a good idea”; yet a lawyer representing Alessandria, Piedmont, noted that with the completion of major railroad construction in Northern Europe, and mob hostility to Italian workers in France, “emigration to America has become a necessity. It is an inevitable evil no one can stop.” Giustino Fortunato from Basilicata believed restricting emigration “would be a calamity for the Southern provinces,”
and a deputy from Bergamo, Lombardy, also argued that limiting emigration would raise Italy's population and lower wages. Was there another solution? A count from Forlì, Romagna, noted it would be more humanitarian to organize internal migration, rather than suppress international migration, and the Socialist leader Andrea Costa called for more study of why people needed to leave their homes. A representative of Milan proposed that the government spend several million lire “to buy land in the faraway regions where emigrants go,” where they could be settled and officially protected; but a Neapolitan count argued that emigration should be “neither protected nor obstructed.” Ominously, Leopoldo Franchetti from Umbria warned that limitations on emigration would undermine the foundations of public rights in Liberal Italy.31

The prime minister Francesco Crispi proposed that emigration could be positive, and that the state could link together emigrant communities, or “colonies,” around the world for an international nation-building project. Crispi had fought for Italian unity in exile, in Sicily as a revolutionary, and in Parliament as a Republican and then as a Liberal monarchist. Massive emigration undermined the prestige of Italian unification as hundreds of thousands voluntarily dispersed in search of better opportunities. In proposing Italy's first emigration legislation in December 1887, Crispi aimed to colonize the emigrants themselves, wherever they traveled. Rather than draining the nation, emigration would expand Italy beyond its boundaries: “The Government cannot remain an indifferent or passive spectator to the destinies of [emigrants]. It must know exactly where they are going and what awaits them; it must accompany them with a vigilant and loving eye . . . it must never lose sight of them in their new home . . . to turn to its advantage the fruits of their labor. Colonies must be like arms, which the country extends far away in foreign districts to bring them within the orbit of its relations of labor and exchange; they must be like an enlargement of the boundaries of its action and its economic power.”32 Crispi believed that Italy could extend a patriotic message to emigrants worldwide, to strengthen them against the assimilationist “melting pots” of Argentina, France, and the United States. Italy could bind emigrants and their children to la madre patria, literally “the mother-fatherland,” through language, culture, and economic ties.

As emigration increased, patriotic communities of Italians abroad did form a loyal international network, rallying in support of Italy's colonial
wars. In 1888, after the Italian military disaster at Dogali, Italians in Alexandria in Egypt raised 5,000 lire for support of the wounded, with smaller amounts donated from Cairo, Rio de Janeiro, and Pernambuco, Brazil. The war ministry, however, declined the money: Italy had suffered few casualties in Africa and, optimistically, the ministry expected few in the future. After Italy’s defeat at Amba Alagi in December 1895, and before the debacle at Adwa in March 1896, Italians in Buenos Aires opened a subscription for the Italian Red Cross. Italians in Chicago, New York, and Tunis attempted to volunteer as recruits in the Italian army. The war ministry again refused their assistance. They insisted that only draftees could serve in the Italian army in Africa and no outside funds were needed or wanted. Perhaps the war ministry resented the foreign ministry’s involvement in African affairs. Nonetheless, Italians abroad felt concern for the fate of Italy’s colonial campaigns, and for Italy’s international reputation, which reflected on Italians everywhere.

Italy in the Scramble for Africa

Italy entered the colonial “scramble for Africa” as a late-comer. At the Berlin Congress of 1878, Italy’s prime minister Benedetto Cairoli followed a far-sighted “clean hands” policy, and refused to stake claims on African territories: he believed that each nation in Europe, and across the world, had the right to self-determination. But other governments did not have such scruples. In March of 1881 the French army marched into Tunis, on Sicily’s doorstep. Italians were shocked at the news. Cairoli fell from power, and his successors scrambled to catch up with France. The new prime minister Agostino Depretis appointed the lawyer Pasquale Stanislao Mancini as foreign minister. Despite his earlier legal theories in support of national independence movements, Mancini launched Italian imperialism in December 1881 by assuming control of a coaling station at Assab, a port claimed by the Ottoman Empire. Fascinated by the Suez Canal, Mancini claimed Italy could “find the key” to the Mediterranean in the Red Sea. In 1882 another opportunity arose when the British government invited Italy and France to join its intervention in Egypt. Both Mancini and the French foreign minister declined the offer, fearing a military defeat. Italy thus restricted its African colonial schemes to the Horn, for the time being. The Italian military expedition to Massawa in 1885 greatly expanded the Red Sea colony and sparked a lengthy de-
bate in Parliament over the expenses. By 1889 Italy also developed
claims to Asmara and eastern Somalia. Meanwhile, the Congo basin
went to Belgium, the vast Sahara to France, lands in southwest and east
Africa to Germany, and Egypt and South Africa to Britain.

If Britain had seized the lion's share of colonial territories, to Italy was
left the hyena's share. Italian ministers continually had to invent argu-
ments for retaining and funding these colonies. Meanwhile, Italy pre-
pared diplomatic support among the European Powers for a claim on the
ancient Roman territory of Libya, ruled by the Ottoman Empire as the
provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. As Italy changed ministries
every few years, some politicians increased the country's commitments
in Africa, but no one felt confident in retreating, as it might erode Italian
prestige. Domenico Farini, president of the Senate and an anticolonial-
ist, explained, “we cannot call back the troops unless we have a success
somewhere else. Otherwise our impotence will be too manifest, our rep-
utation too damaged.” There seemed no way out of Africa.

Mass migration and the possibility of settlement offered a new role for
Italy's Red Sea colony as it grew in size and expense. Beginning in the
1870s, the abuse and deception of emigrants made newspaper headlines
regularly throughout Italy. In 1885, Mancini exploited emigration to
justify colonialism. He postulated, first, that Italian emigrants should
not be scattered all over the world; second, the economic success of Ital-
i ans in South America suggested likely successes in Africa as well; and
third, perhaps Italy should establish “agricultural colonies” for Euro-
pean settlement in the African interior, besides commercial stations on
the coast. However, Mancini became distracted by the Scramble for
Africa, not wanting Italy to lose its place in the “generous competition”
to a “not great State” like Belgium. He made international prestige the
foundation of Italian colonialism, heralding Italy's heritage from Colum-
bus to Vespucci as a summons to empire.

Two years after Mancini left office in 1885, Francesco Crispi proposed
to fulfill Italy's international calling with a grand program combining
emigration and colonial expansion. Crispi had arrived at imperialism af-
ther an odyssey of political rejection and aborted revolution. He was born
in 1818 in southwestern Sicily, 130 miles from the Tunisian coast of
Africa. Exiled after fighting in the 1848 revolution, Crispi returned to
Sicily in 1860 as second in command of Giuseppe Garibaldi's Expedition
of the Thousand. The expedition's 1,087 men and two women joined
with peasant rebels to overthrow the Kingdom of Naples in a brilliant campaign through Sicily, Calabria, and Campania. After Garibaldi surrendered his gains to the King of Piedmont, Crispi abandoned the antimonarchist republican ideals of his former mentor, Giuseppe Mazzini. Crispi made Italy's unity under the new king his overriding priority. He entered government in 1876, but fell from power the following year in a bigamy scandal. In impotent fury, he railed in 1881 against Cairoli, also a member of the Thousand, for his failure to secure Tunisia, and blasted Mancini for losing Egypt the next year. The Red Sea colony was no substitute for territory in the Mediterranean.

When Crispi became prime minister and foreign minister in 1887, after the Dogali defeat, he promoted an aggressive foreign policy as a way to solve Italy's internal problems, especially its unimproved agriculture, endemic unemployment, and backward social structures in the South. He hoped the creation of overseas settlements would liberate Italians from the archaic great estates and tiny, scattered landholdings that polarized rural society and strangled economic development. Thus, despite his earlier opposition to Mancini's projects in the same territories, in 1889 Crispi made passionate appeals to Parliament for increased funding for Italy's colony on the Red Sea: “do you believe, o sirs, that the favors of fortune can be obtained without sacrifices? All the great conquests cost the various Powers in the beginning, and cost greatly! The benefits were gathered late. And must we, now that we are at the point of drawing profit from the money spent and the blood shed—today when we can have in Africa, at short distance from Italy, a territory to colonize, that permits us to direct all that mass of unfortunates who run to America to search their fortune—must we renounce this benefit which we are about to assure for our homeland?” In Crispi's mind, Italy's overseas emigration could be turned to a direct advantage to the state. By moving the field of migration from America to Africa, Italy could establish its reputation as a world power. In 1890 he joined Asmara and the ports of Assab and Massawa to form the colony of “Eritrea” on the Red Sea. Assab and Massawa were hot, harsh deserts, but Asmara on the high plateau enjoyed a temperate climate, free of the tsetse fly, with some of the best agricultural land on the continent of Africa. Crispi announced Eritrea as a haven for Italian emigration “under the dominion and laws of Italy.” Territorial settlements would strengthen Italy's African colony and allow masses of emigrants to thrive amid transplanted Italian customs, traditions, and society in the shadow of the Italian flag.
Crispi’s vision relied upon the example of the British Empire. Britain’s settler colonies in North America, Australia, New Zealand, and even South Africa captivated Italian politicians. Through spontaneous settlement in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and subsidized or penal settlement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Britain had established new colonial cultures and economies, overwhelming any local competitors. German imperialists hoped to accomplish the same results in southwest Africa. Like Italy, Germany was a new state experiencing mass migration in the 1880s. Naval enthusiasts in both countries pointed to Britain’s use of military force in defending emigration routes and settlements. The British Emigrants’ Information Office, which provided information on all emigration destinations while steering attention toward Australia, South Africa, and Canada, became a model for similar Italian and German institutions. Italian officials also envied the success of French colonization in Algeria, adopting the categorical worldview of Paul Leroy-Beaulieu: lands were either “population colonies” for white settlement, “exploitation colonies” for capitalist investment, or “mixed colonies” for both.

Italian plans for a population colony in Italian Africa were expensive and controversial. The big newspapers of Northern Italy opposed wasting money in demographic settlements. Exploration of East Africa’s resources did not satisfy the high hopes raised by the irrational Scramble for Africa. Yet Crispi’s projects did find popular support, especially in the South. If the Italian people could not be supported at home, perhaps they could still live under Italian protection in nearby Italian Africa. This emigration would not diminish Italy’s population or bolster rivals. Following a view of population control dating to the Middle Ages, many viewed spontaneous emigration as a “hemorrhage” of Italy’s best blood, assuming that the most industrious of the poor would emigrate to better themselves. In the Darwinian struggle between national peoples, the Italian race would falter unless the government retained its population, the basis for national survival.

Italians agreed that emigration was unstoppable; only the destination was in question. Although large landowners complained of a shrinking workforce and rising wages, the burgeoning population on Italy’s narrow territory raised fears of revolution. Perhaps emigration could bring benefits. Industrialists such as Alessandro Rossi called for deregulation of emigration, arguing that restrictions only forced Italians to travel clandestinely from foreign ports. This supported Italy’s competitors instead
of Italy's own shipping industry and navy, and stunted Italy's possibilities of becoming a great naval power. To test his ideas, Rossi sponsored a paternalist settlement of Catholic emigrants in Eritrea. In Africa Italy could redeem its reputation, its economy, and its population beyond its borders.

The Failure of Demographic Colonialism

Rossi's was not the only experimental demographic settlement. In 1890 Parliament authorized Leopoldo Franchetti, a conservative baron from Tuscany, to settle several dozen families in pilot communities. Franchetti had coauthored with Sidney Sonnino a landmark study of southern Italy and Sicily in 1876. The two authors, both trained in Britain, highlighted the systemic social problems tied to the extensive cultivation of large estates, and proposed Tuscan-style sharecropping (mezzadria) as an alternative. As Liberal Italy failed to reform the South, by the late 1880s Franchetti came to see Africa as the only road to Italy's redemption. By distributing new land to Italians transplanted outside of Italy, the vicious circles in Italian agriculture would be broken. In Eritrea Franchetti created regulations for expropriating territory and distributing it among Italian settlers. With strict property contracts he meant to ensure that Italian colonists would support themselves on their own land, avoiding the establishment of large capitalist plantations and a big state bureaucracy.

Franchetti soon clashed with the colony's military government, in part because of his prickly personality. He fought at least three duels over insults to his work in Eritrea: in 1891 with Governor-General Gandolfi and with the editor of La Tribuna, and in 1902 with the Foreign Minister Giulio Prinetti. Prime Minister Antonio di Rudinì naively hoped the duels of 1891 would resolve the differences between Franchetti and the colonial commander Gandolfi, but their basic goals for the colony were incompatible. Franchetti promoted a vigorous consolidation within Eritrea and rightly saw that war against Ethiopia would ruin his settlements. The army commanders, on the other hand, opposed the limitations of civilian government in the colonies.

Oreste Baratieri, the longest-serving military governor of Eritrea, proposed in 1890 an alternative to Franchetti's purely secular settlement: Italian Catholic missionary work. Like Crispi, Baratieri had been one of